Introduction

One of my secret pleasures as a boy was to sit for hours poring over my father's collection of photography books. There, in *The Family of Man*, *Days to Remember*, and others, I saw disclosed the strange and varied wonder of the human condition, at least as it appeared to professional photojournalists at mid-century: children in Bombay lifting their smiling faces to the rain; Jackie Robinson, "first Negro in major league baseball"; the first television. There were also many disturbing pictures of grief, tragedy, and violence, indelible images of mob slayings and suicides, terrible industrial accidents and "the war in Indo-China." But of them all, one particular image haunted me the most: a group of Midwesterners standing in a circle in the snow, cheering on a young boy of about seven years old as he beat a fox to death with a baseball bat.[1] The boy, with a bright smile, stands with his legs firmly planted, as though waiting for a pitch that never comes. The fox, crouched, tongue lolling, exhausted almost to the point of death, gazes vacantly, a look of hopelessness or resignation visible in his pinched face. Then, dark against the blood-spattered snow, one sees the small, broken bodies of two other foxes, already dead. But what stands out most in my mind are the rosy-cheeked men (and a few women) in their winter clothes, standing shoulder to shoulder or kneeling in the snow to form a tight cordon of death around boy and fox. All of them are grinning. And it is this last detail, of ordinary human beings taking delight in the torture of a powerless individual, an animal, that still troubles me the most.

Many of us have encountered similar images, read similar accounts, of public spectacles in which atrocity has mixed incongruously with joy. What is it about the human condition that induces otherwise ordinary people to murder

the powerless, whether human or nonhuman, with such evident pleasure? For it is indeed pleasure we see in faces of whites celebrating beside the sexually mutilated corpse of a hanged and burned black man in the American South,[2] pleasure that onlookers saw in the animated faces of Hutu men and women as they swung machetes against their defenseless Tutsi neighbors, singing,[3] pleasure etched in the smiles of Gestapo officers laughing as they kicked naked Jewish women cowering in the dust at their feet. "In Kaunas, Lithuania, where Einsatzkommando 3 operated," reads one account from World War II, "the Jews were clubbed to death with crowbars, before cheering crowds, mothers holding up their children to see the fun, and German soldiers clustered round like spectators at a football match. At the end, while the streets ran with blood, the chief murderer stood on the pile of corpses as a triumphant hero and played the Lithuanian national anthem on an accordion."[4] A German army colonel who came upon this scene later remarked: "At first I thought this must be a victory celebration or some type of sporting event because of the cheering, clapping and laughter that kept breaking out." Only when he got closer and the scene came into focus did he realize his perceptual error.[5]

The question posed by the chapters in this volume is how much closer we ourselves need to get to the reality of our own society's violence against other animals before we are able to perceive that violence for what it is—atrocity. When will we begin to see something fundamentally amiss in the ubiquitous pictures and TV images we see of grinning hunters posed beside the corpses of elk or deer, or of fishermen giving the thumbs-up sign beside heaped-up mounds of squid or crabs or other marine creatures dredged up from the deep and tossed up onto ship decks to suffocate, or to be beaten insensible with claw hammers and crowbars? At what point do we begin to suspect that something serious is wrong with our world—that something fundamental may be at stake—when we learn that workers at a pig farm kill sick or injured baby pigs by swinging them by their tails and smashing their heads against the concrete? Or when we read in the newspaper, over our morning coffee, that in Puerto Rico, "unwanted dogs, cats and even farm animals [are] hurled from bridges, intentionally crushed by vehicles or butchered with machetes," apparently as a form of recreation?[6]

Such ruthless and extreme acts of violence against other animals are in fact the norm in every society in the world. In France, wealthy gourmands can still arrange a private meal of roasted ortolan—the endangered songbird who, by tradition, has its eyes put out before being force-fed for weeks and then drowned in a snifter of brandy. In Spain, over 11,000 bulls are ritually tortured and killed before thousands of cheering human beings each year. In the Middle East, Muslims celebrate Eid and Ramadan by slitting the throats of hundreds of thousands of live goats, cheering as they struggle in pain, bleed-

ing to death. In 2006, officials in southwestern Yunnan Province in China "killed more than 50,000 pet dogs in five days," after a few isolated cases of rabies appeared in the province. "Dogs being walked were taken from their owners and beaten on the spot. . . . Other teams entered villages at night, creating noise to get dogs barking, and then beating them to death."[7] In some instances, owners were forced to hang their own dogs in front of their houses, while their children looked on. Two years later, Chinese officials ordered a similar pogrom of cats in Beijing in preparation for the Olympic games. Hundreds of thousands of cats were rounded up, packed tightly into wire cages, then transferred to what Chinese observers termed "death camps" set up on the capital's periphery. There, they were killed outright or simply left to starve or succumb slowly to disease. Thousands more were sent to Guangzhou, apparently to be killed for their flesh—Chinese restaurants serve cat.[8]

But even such organized pogroms pale in significance beside the smoothly functioning planetary system of routine extermination—the gigantic, technologically advanced, mechanized apparatus whose sole function is to produce, destroy, and process the bodies and minds of thousands of millions of living beings each year. So normalized and naturalized has this violence become that we only become aware of its existence when the apparatus unexpectedly goes awry, threatening either public health or an industry's bottom line. Only then does an otherwise obscure system of mass killing emerge briefly from the background of daily life to enter the public's consciousness, and then only as spectacle. In 2001, thus, it was only when farm animals in Britain became sickened with foot-and-mouth disease (a purely commercial illness—most infected animals recover on their own), and the English and Irish states ordered the mass killing of six million cows and sheep—the animals' bodies were dumped into huge open pits and set afire, the smoke darkening skies over the British Isles and drifting across the Channel—that the hidden system of routine mass violence suddenly spilled out into the open. Three years later, a similar rupture in the narrative of normal slaughter occurred when the Asian poultry industry grappled with an outbreak of the H5N1 virus. Within weeks, *220 million* ducks, geese, and chickens, healthy and sick alike, were burned alive, suffocated, strangled, shot, and beaten with pipes—killed with savage and remorseless violence as though they themselves were to blame for the excruciating illness which their own squalid confinement and brutal treatment had made them susceptible to.

"So long as living creatures with physiological makeups very close to our own are reduced to resource-objects for human appropriation," Carl Boggs observes in his chapter in this volume, "virtually anything is possible." To which, however, we must add: *and everything is permitted*. The inner essence

of fascism and totalitarianism, of atrocity, lies not in ideology as such, but in willed actions whose purpose is to show that there are *no limits* to what can be done to the individual, or even to entire classes of individuals. What finally links images of Americans murdering foxes in the Midwest to reports of the Einsatzkommando 3 murdering Jews in Kaunas—or rather, what allows us to recognize atrocity *as* atrocity, whether perpetrated against human beings or against other animals—is neither the joy, ruthlessness, or simply boredom of the killers, nor the helpless terror, anguish, and suffering of the defenseless victims, but the way the two become conjoined in a mode of action whose symbolic function is to demonstrate absolute superiority of one group over another. As Jacques Semelin writes in his authoritative discussion of the origins, nature, and political uses of genocide and massacre, it is the perpetrator's "situation of impunity" that enables him to feel pleasure "not only at making others suffer but by enjoying the all-powerful state over the victim who is completely at his mercy."[9] To witness atrocity—to see those wielding total power annihilate those who have no power at all—is to see ontologized or made real a relation which, until that moment, could only be expressed ideologically—namely, the *idea* of the worthlessness of the other, the other's lack of a right to exist. It was this ideology that defined the relation of the fascist state to its enemies in the 1930s and 1940s, and it is this ideology, this relation, which today lies at the deepest core of our relations with the other beings-in-the-world, those "others" who we reduce by that singular and utterly fraudulent sign, "the animal." Exposing this ideology, revealing its material and psychic underpinnings and limits, is the main objective of this book.

ANIMAL LIBERATION AND TOTAL CRITIQUE

Critical Theory and Animal Liberation is intended to draw into sharper relief the relationship between the human oppression of other animals and the thematic concerns and political commitments characteristic of the critical or Left tradition in social and political thought. While critical theory today encompasses a wide range of methodological and thematic approaches, including Marxism, feminism, existential phenomenology, Habermasian discourse theory, critical race theory, and queer theory, the term was first used in reference to the work of a group of Marxist sociologists and philosophers based at the Institut für Sozialforschung, or Institute for Social Research, in Frankfurt am Main in Germany. Though only two of the chapters in the present volume focus directly on the scholarly work of the Frankfurt School, as it came to be known, all of them are informed by the school's critical sensibility and spirit.

Founded in 1923 by Felix Weil, the son of a wealthy businessman who made his fortune (ironically) in the meat business, the Frankfurt School was intended as a Left-intellectual answer to the more conservative academic institutes then being funded by the social democratic German state. The purpose of the institute was to explore the role of social institutions and ideologies in perpetuating systems of authority and social hierarchy. The institute's theorists drew on the work of Marx and Freud as well as critical sociology and philosophy in an effort to analyze the deepest structural and psychological elements of fascism and capitalism. Herbert Marcuse, one of the most influential early members of the Frankfurt School, defined the institute's critical or "dialectical" theoretical approach this way in his 1968 preface to *Reason and Revolution*, his study of the influence of Hegel and Marx on social philosophy:

> Dialectical thought starts with the experience that the world is unfree; that is to say, man and nature exist in conditions of alienation, exist "other than they are." Any mode of thought which excludes this contradiction from its logic is [therefore] a faulty logic. Thought "corresponds" to reality only as it transforms reality by comprehending its contradictory structure.[10]

Critical theory thus sets out from a single intuition about the world—that the predominant values, institutions, representational schemata, and so forth of the prevailing social order are a distortion of the real, unjustly constituted in such a way as to prevent the world from becoming something other than it "is"; that is, from becoming what it *ought to be*. Critical theory thus rejects from the outset the ontological distinction in the positivist social sciences between facts and values. Rather than feign a neutral or disinterested stance toward the world—the image of the theorist as innocent abroad, unburdened by ethical or social *values*—the *critical* theorist sets out instead from a prior standpoint of normative sociological critique and existential refusal. Here there is no question of whether theory or practice comes first. As Marcuse writes, "praxis does not only come at the end but is already present in the beginning of the theory."[11] Confronted with a totality rooted in *unfreedom*, the critical theorist seeks to generate forms of knowledge and practice that are themselves "real"—which is to say, adequate to the task of comprehending, and changing, the totality of existing social fact. The goal of critical praxis, therefore, is to liberate humanity and nature too from the brutalizing logics of power that prevent us from realizing our capacities and essence as free, creative beings.

At least two affinities suggest themselves between the early Frankfurt School critique of capitalist society and the critique by animal liberationists of speciesism. First, as a *critical* theory, the critique of speciesism too sets out from the prior assumption or experience of the world as unfree, that is, from the intuition that human and animal "exist in conditions of alienation," and hence are

"other than they are." Like the Frankfurt School critics, then, animal liberationists implicate by their critique not merely one aspect of the existing order, but the entirety of human history and culture. To take the claims and concerns of the animal liberationist critique seriously means to question existing economic arrangements, social norms, science and technology, cultural expression, and the foundational terms of social and political thought.[12] Second, animal liberationism is a critical theory, even the most fundamental critical theory, insofar as it shares with other emancipatory traditions the desire to redeem the conscious living *subject*, or person, from thoughtlessness, violence, and domination. Every form of radical praxis arguably has two moments. The first moment is phenomenological, the *revealing* of a suppressed mode of existence (the experiences of the oppressed). The second moment is normative and active—the affirmation of the oppressed subject's experiences through political struggle and the negation of the existing unjust order. We might say that the entire emancipatory tradition—the revolutionary commitment to universal freedom in thought and deed—is therefore grounded in the defense of the *person*, of consciousness, from the indignities and humiliations that power would impose upon it. Hence Rolf Wiggershaus's apt description of Max Horkheimer, the Institute's first director, as having been motivated by "indignation at the injustices being perpetrated on those who [are] exploited and humiliated."[13] Both Horkheimer and his close friend and colleage at the institute, Theodor W. Adorno, saw nonhuman animals to be among the most exploited and humiliated of living subjects. As Christina Gerhardt observes in her chapter "Thinking With: Animals in Schopenhauer, Horkheimer and Adorno," in seeking a way beyond (or through) Kantian rationalism via Schopenhauer's ethics of sympathy, both thinkers hoped to recuperate the animal other as a major subject of moral concern. Through their "shared nexus of concerns," vis-à-vis the animal and the human, the two sought a *politicized* morality in which concern for the other would stand as a kind of barrier to absolute violence. Herbert Marcuse himself (Horkheimer and Adorno's junior colleague at the Institute) appears to have shared their views of other animals. In *One-Dimensional Man*, for example, when Marcuse affirms the socialist view that existing human culture is a hell on earth, he immediately adds that "[p]art of this Hell is the ill-treatment of animals—the work of a human society whose rationality is still the irrational."[14] In *Eros and Civilization*, similarly, Marcuse invoked the myth of Orpheus in his call for a new, post-capitalist civilizational order that might "sing" the natural world back to life, restoring subjectivity to other animals. "In being spoken to, loved, and cared for, flowers and springs and animals [would at last] appear as what they are—beautiful, not only for those who address and regard them, but for themselves, 'objectively.'"[15] The search for a new mode of address to the natural world, a form of *Mitsein* or inter-being in which humans might learn to live alongside the

other conscious beings without imposing their own violent categories and systems upon them, was in fact central to the Frankfurt School's ethical vision.

A stake for these early critics was not only the moral problem of nonhuman suffering at human hands, but the self-estrangement of our own animality, as well. As Zipporah Weisberg writes in her psychoanalytic critique of speciesism in these pages, "Animal Repression: Speciesism as Pathology," even as we oppress the other animals we also repress our own animal natures and cut ourselves off from any meaningful connection with the other beings. The result is "an unconscious sense of loss, melancholia, ambivalence, [and] guilt," among other neuroses. The human being "transforms itself into a kind of object—an unthinking automaton, a one-dimensional shell." Weisberg quotes the following vivid passage from Horkheimer and Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (first published in 1944), on the torment and controlled killing of live animals in the scientific laboratories of the behaviorists:

> [They] apply to human beings the same formulae and results which they wring without restraint from defenseless animals in their abominable physiological laboratories. . . . The conclusion they draw from the mutilated animal bodies applies, not to animals in freedom, but to human beings today. By mistreating animals they announce that they, and only they in the whole of creation, function voluntarily in the same mechanical, blind, automatic way as the twitching movements of the bound victims made use of by the expert.[16]

Here the alert reader will hear the echo of earlier Romantic critiques of the experimental sciences, whose erstwhile technological innovations were seen only to confirm the species' lack of *moral* progress. As Mephistopheles remarks to God in Goethe's *Faust*:

> The little god of earth remains the same queer sprite
> As on the first day, or in primal light.
> His life would be less difficult, poor thing,
> Without your gift of heavenly glimmering;
> He calls it Reason, using light celestial
> Just to outdo the beasts in being bestial.[17]

As Susan Benston relates in her moving poem here, *Neuroscience* (the only creative writing included in this volume), the language, methodological protocols, and instrumental practices of contemporary technoscientific research on animals are evocative of medieval barbarism—and reminders of the ways in which modern human subjectivity remains rooted in a colossal bad faith. The scientist's religious language of "sacrifice" ironically underscores the heedless sacrifice of his own vaunted humanity. In Benston's imagery, the

monkey strapped to a restraint table emerges as a Christ-like figure whose inability of consent to the humiliations and torments to which she is subjected mirrors the scientist's own inability to comprehend or "consent" to the sadistic role he has chosen to play out in the lab.

In tormenting other animals, the human scientist performs what Aaron Bell in "The Dialectic of Anthropocentrism," his chapter here, terms an "auto-vivisection": "one must cut into one's own being in order to remove or place to one side those features of oneself that are incidental and held in common with the rest of the 'natural world,' the 'meat' of one's being, in order to find that tissue which is essential to the human." As Bell argues, this excision of the animal *within* the human leads to what Hegel termed "radical evil," an extreme solipsism in which the subject—in this case, *Homo sapiens*—seeks to destroy all that is other. It was precisely such solipsism that led Horkheimer and Adorno to indict modern civilization for having reduced the universe to a "unified" cosmic hunting ground "in which nothing exists but prey."[18] Unable to recognize or acknowledge the animal other *as* other—that is, as a being worthy of being addressed as a "Thou" (see Josephine Donovan, this volume)—humanity subsequently falls into the ugly role of a universal Procrustes. Procrustes, it is to be recalled, was the dread bandit in Greek myth who alternately stretched or cut his guests' legs to fit his bed. According to the *Penguin Dictionary of Symbols*, the Procrustes myth represents "the perversion of idealism into conventionality and a symbol of the tyranny exercised by those who only tolerate the activities and opinions of others when they satisfy their own standards." This makes Procrustes a potent "symbol of totalitarianism, whether exercised by individual, party or state."[19] Or by the *species*. For as Karen Davis shows in her chapter here, "Procrustean Solutions to Animal Identity," the genetic, behavioral, and psychological manipulation of chickens and other exploited animal species produces the most excruciating and mutilated forms of animal being, as commercial animal industries wholly suppress their life-needs in the quest for profit.

Weisberg, Bell, Davis, and indeed all the contributors to our volume show that the compulsory forgetting, or repression, of our own animal essence—that is, of the knowledge that we human beings are always already caught up with the drama of *being animal* (desiring, feeling, experiencing, suffering, laboring, loving, and so on)—prepares the way for the unending catastrophes of modernity. This is to say that speciesism is both symptomatic of and constitutive of a total mode of domination. Negation of the animal other is not a side concern to the "real issues" facing human social life but the pivot around which our civilization itself has formed, the phenomenological *ground* upon which the figure of the human being continues to stand. As Horkheimer and Adorno observed:

> Throughout European history, the idea of the human being has been expressed in contradistinction to the animal. The latter's lack of reason is the proof of human dignity. So insistently and unanimously has this antithesis been recited by all the earliest precursors of bourgeois thought, the ancient Jews, the Stoics, and the Early Fathers, and then through the Middle Ages to modern times, that few other ideas are so fundamental to Western anthropology.[20]

The animal other is thus not only the material stuff of civilization—the flesh and bone, labor and intelligence we exploit for our purposes—but the psycho-semiotic medium upon which we inscribe the entirety of our culture, our philosophy, our cosmology. Hence Adorno's continual return to the problem of the animal: as Eduardo Mendieta points out in his chapter in these pages, "Animal Is to Kantianism as Jew Is to Fascism: Adorno's Bestiary," Adorno's whole philosophy was centrally a "critique of metaphysics and [of] its implicit positive anthropology that delimits the human and reason by invidiously excluding the animal."

In arriving at these conclusions, it is worth noting, both Adorno and Horkheimer seem to have been influenced by the work of the psychologist and social theorist Wilhelm Reich. Though not a member of the Frankfurt School, "Willi" Reich (as Adorno refers to him in his letters) was nevertheless a fellow traveler in the circles of critical philosophy of the 1930s, a maverick German intellectual who, like the sociologists and philosophers of the Frankfurt School, felt that the rise of fascism had thrown the most fundamental assumptions concerning European civilization into doubt. That Nazism could develop in such a culturally "advanced" society, one at the very height of its creative and technological powers, required a rethinking of the bases of Western civilization. It was in this spirit of a grand *epochē* or bracketing of Europe's own common-sense notions of modernity that Reich thought he had traced fascism and the authoritarian personality to a foundational hatred of the animal, a hatred which, he argued, had come to structure virtually the entirety of human consciousness and culture. Whether in man's "science, his religion, his art, or his other expressions of life," Reich wrote in *The Mass Psychology of Fascism*, first published in 1933, the "highest task of human existence" is held to be the 'slaying of his animal side' and the cultivation of 'values.'"

> Man is fundamentally an animal. . . . [Yet] man developed the peculiar idea that he was not an animal; *he* was a "man," and he had long since divested himself of the "vicious" and "brutal." Man takes great pains to disassociate himself from the vicious animal and to prove that he "is better" by pointing to his culture and his civilization, which distinguish him from the animal. His entire attitude, his "theories of value," moral philosophies, his "monkey trials," all bear witness to the fact that he does not want to be reminded that he is fundamentally an animal,

> that he has incomparably more in common with "the animal" than he has with that which he thinks and dreams himself to be. . . . His viciousness, his inability to live peacefully with his own kind, his wars, bear witness to the fact that man is distinguished from the other animals only by a boundless sadism and the mechanical trinity of an authoritarian view of life, mechanistic science, and the machine. If one looks back over long stretches of the results of human civilization, one finds that man's claims are not only false, but are peculiarly contrived to make him forget that he is an animal.[21]

This *episteme*, to borrow Foucault's term, has subtended and conditioned the whole of civilization from its beginning, providing the very basis of positive human culture. For centuries, our sciences and systems of knowledge have conspired to divide sentient life, conscious being-in-the-world, into two neat, mutually exclusive, and utterly fraudulent halves—"the human" versus "the rest."[22] Paradoxically, though, in distancing ourselves from the animal other, we end up disavowing our own humanity (itself, after all, a form of *animality*) embracing a "machine civilization" based in death-fetishism. "How is it possible," Reich wondered, "that [man] does not see the damages (psychic illnesses, biopathies, sadism, and wars) to his health, culture, and mind that are caused by this biologic renunciation?"[23]

It is striking that Reich, Adorno, and Horkheimer, all of whom were personally forced to flee Germany by Hitler, had no qualms about comparing the human treatment of animals to the treatment of Jews and other enemies of the Third Reich under fascism.[24] After the war, Adorno famously wrote that "Auschwitz begins wherever someone looks at a slaughterhouse and thinks: they're only animals," a once-obscure quote that recently has been given new life by animal rights activists and sympathetic scholars. In fact, pointed comparisons of our treatment of other animals to the Nazis' treatment of the Jews and others in the Holocaust are peppered throughout Adorno's work, sometimes showing up in the most unexpected places (including a study of Beethoven's music). As Mendieta observes here, Adorno drew an explicit link between Kant's denial of any meaningful subjectivity or moral worth to animals and the catastrophes of the twentieth century, including the rise of National Socialism. "Nothing is more abhorrent to the Kantian," he wrote, "than a reminder of man's resemblance to animals. This taboo is always at work when the idealist berates the materialist. *Animals play for the idealist system virtually the same role as the Jews for fascism*."[25]

Indeed, is speciesism itself not a form of fascism, perhaps even its paradigmatic or primordial form? The very word "massacre," Semelin observes, originally meant "putting an animal to death": human massacres of other humans have always been realized through the semiotic transposition of the one abject subject onto the other. "Killing supposedly human 'animals' then

becomes entirely possible."[26] Adorno made a similar point in *Minima Moralia*, sixty years earlier: "The constantly encountered assertion that savages, blacks, Japanese are like animals, monkeys for example, is the key to the pogrom. The possibility of pogroms is decided in the moment when the gaze of a fatally-wounded animal falls on a human being."[27] What is crucial to bear in mind, however, as Victoria Johnson points out in her chapter here ("Everyday Rituals of the Master Race: Fascism, Stratification, and the Fluidity of 'Animal' Domination") the very "power of such animal metaphors depends on a prior cultural understanding of other animals themselves, as beings who are by nature abject, degraded, and hence worthy of extermination." The animal, thus, rests at the intersection of race and caste systems. And nowhere is the link between the human and nonhuman caste systems clearer than "in fascist ideology," for "no other discourse so completely authorizes absolute violence against the weak." In our own contemporary society too, Johnson emphasizes, we find daily life and meaning based on elaborate rituals intended to keep us from acknowledging the violence we do to subordinate classes of beings, above all the animals.

So numerous in fact are the parallels—semiotic, ideological, psychological, historical, cultural, technical, and so forth—between the Nazis' extermination of the Jews and Roma and the routinized mass murder of nonhuman beings, that Charles Patterson's recent book on the subject, *Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust*, despite its strengths, only manages to scratch the surface of a topic whose true dimensions have yet to be fathomed.[28] In the ideological mechanisms used to legitimate killing, in the bad faith of the human beings who collude with the killing through indifference or "ignorance of the facts," above all in the technologies of organized murder—practices of confinement and control, modes of legitimation and deception, methods of elimination (gassing, shooting, clubbing, burning, vivisecting, and so on)—the mass killing of animals today cannot but recall the Nazi liquidation of European Jewry and Roma. The late Jacques Derrida observed that "there are also animal genocides."[29] With uncharacteristic moral sobriety he wrote:

> [T]he annihilation of certain species is indeed in progress, but it is occurring through the organization and exploitation of an artificial, infernal, virtually interminable *survival*, in conditions that previous generations would have judged monstrous, outside of every supposed norm of a life proper to animals that are thus exterminated by means of their continued existence or even overpopulation. As if, for example, instead of throwing people into ovens or gas chambers (let's say Nazis) doctors and geneticists had decided to organize the overproduction and overgeneration of Jews, gypsies, and homosexuals by means of artificial insemination, so that, being more numerous and better fed, they could be destined

> in always increasing numbers for the same hell, that of the imposition of genetic experimentation or extermination by gas or fire.[30]

What would it mean for us to come to terms with the knowledge that civilization, our whole mode of development and culture, has been premised and built upon extermination—on a history experienced as "terror without end" (to borrow a phrase from Adorno)?[31]

To dwell with such a thought would be to throw into almost unbearable relief the distance between our narratives of inherent human dignity and grace and moral superiority, on one side, and the most elemental facts of our actual social existence, on the other. We congratulate ourselves for our social progress—for democratic governance and state-protected civil and human rights (however notional or incompletely defended)—yet continue to enslave and kill millions of sensitive creatures who in many biological, hence emotional and cognitive, particulars resemble us. To truly meditate on such a contradiction is to comprehend our self-understanding to be not merely flawed, but to be almost comically delusional. Immanuel Kant dreamed of a moral order in which we would all participate as equals in a "kingdom of ends." But it is time to ask whether morality as such is even possible under conditions of universal bad faith and hidden slaughter, in the same way that we might ask whether acts of private morality under National Socialism were not compromised or diminished by the larger context in which they occurred.[32] When atrocity becomes the very basis of society, does society not forfeit its right to call itself moral? In the nineteenth century, the animal welfare advocate Edward Maitland warned that our destruction of the other animals lead only to our own "debasement and degradation of character" as a species. "For the principles of Humanity cannot be renounced with impunity; but their renunciation, if persisted in, involves inevitably the forfeiture of Humanity itself. And to cease through such forfeiture to be man is to become demon."[33] What else indeed can we call a being but *demon* who enslaves and routinely kills thousands of millions of other gentle beings, imprisons them in laboratories, electrocutes or poisons or radiates or drowns them? A being who tests the capacity of empathy in other beings by forcing them to choose between life-sustaining food and subjecting a stranger of their own species in an adjacent tank or cage to painful electrical shocks? And what does it tell us about the vaunted moral superiority of humankind that while the rat, the octopus, the monkey will forgo food to avoid harming another, the human researcher will persist in tormenting his captive, until he or she collapses in convulsions and dies? Do such tests, designed to detect the presence of empathy in other species, only demonstrate the paucity of empathy in our own? Above all, it is the existential question that haunts: Who, or rather what, are we?

ANIMAL RIGHTS AND THE COMPLICATED LEGACY OF THE LEFT

If the authors in this volume have a single shared objective, it is to provide a historical rather than metaphysical answer to this last question—that is, to illuminate the structural, economic, and psycho-social forces that give rise to speciesism as a total mode of domination. To pose the problem this way is to identify our project with the Left tradition. However, notwithstanding the recurring interest of early members of the Frankfurt School in the problem of speciesism, the Left with few exceptions has historically viewed human violence toward other beings with indifference. In fact, as John Sorenson shows in his chapter here, "Constructing Extremists, Rejecting Compassion: Ideological Attacks on Animal Advocacy from Right and Left," it is one of the ironies of social thought that the views of leftists and rightists converge on the question of animal rights. Both sides affirm the sovereign right of members of *Homo sapiens* to exploit and kill other living beings as they wish; both view animal liberation as a danger to established human society. To critics of the political right, the very idea of animal rights is a threat to free enterprise and a symptom of a "relativist," godless, and effeminate secular society in decline. (Pundits draw on masculine paranoia and nationalism to defend meat, circulating articles suggesting that vegetarianism is "making kids 'gay'" and "feminizing" America.[34]) In the United States, animal rights activists themselves have been portrayed as "enemies of the human race" who seem bent on outright "human extermination"[35]; far-right movements in other countries have similarly incorporated *species right* into their defense of ultranationalist sentiments.[36] Where the Right sees animal rights as a national apocalypse and a threat to free enterprise, however, the Left warns of the end of secular enlightenment and social progress. Peter Staudenmaier, for example, a student of the anarchist theorist Murray Bookchin, warns that animal rights is "'a moral mistake and a symptom of political confusion . . . anti-humanist and anti-ecological . . . at odds with the project of creating a free world.'"[37] Along the same lines, the ecological Marxist Joel Kovel describes animal rights activists as "fundamentalists" who "forget that all creatures, however they may be recognized, are still differentiated and that we make use of other creatures within our human nature."[38] In a similar vein, one writer on a Marxist listserv responded this way to an earlier post by a critic asking whether Hegel's "master-slave" dialectic might not be applicable to the relation between humans and animals: "Unless you've done a Vulcan mind-meld and know something I don't, animals are incapable of self-consciousness, or of any deliberative ethical judgment, hence the master-slave dialectic is irrelevant in this regard. Since I'm in favor of anthropocentrism, as is any rational human being, I wouldn't waste my time worrying about this."[39]

It is just such widespread, unthinking prejudice on the Left that has led liberal animal rights theorists like Robert Garner to conclude that neither socialism nor feminism has much to offer much from "an animal protectionist perspective." As Garner notes, there is nothing in the historical record to suggest "that at the level of praxis the theoretical case for incorporation has been accepted by anything more than a small proportion of feminists and socialists."[40] Whence this hostility of radical intellectuals to animal liberation as such?

The origins of the Left's hostility to animal rights can be traced back to the unresolved ambivalences and tensions at the heart of the humanist and Enlightenment traditions from which it sprang. On the one hand, the early modern period saw the rise of a secular-scientific worldview that "disenchanted" the living natural world and reduced all living beings—including human ones—to the status of mere things to be controlled. The humanist faith in "the dignity of man"—the principle from which all modern progressive movements eventually evolved—was from the start drawn in contradistinction to the perpetually degraded and irrational animal. Already by the early seventeenth century, the fate of nonhuman beings in the modern era had been decided in Francis Bacon's *New Atlantis* (1627), a utopian scientific novel that anticipates, and indeed provides the conceptual blueprints for, the genetic engineering of the twenty-first century. The triumph of vivisectionists and their proponents, including René Descartes, Nicholas Malebranche, Antoine Arnould, and Robert Boyle, among others, confirmed that the nonhuman animal would now be made productive for the human sciences.[41] The advent of modernity, and with it the descent of an "iron cage of reason," produced new modes of control and manipulation—the bureaucratized nation state, rationalization, new technologies of control, the homogenizing and standardizing effects of commodity fetishism, and so on—that trapped human and nonhuman beings alike.

But this is not the whole story, and it is important to resist the poststructuralist vogue in animal studies for simplistic denunciations of the Enlightenment.[42] For it is one of the ironies of the Enlightenment and secularization that it was also in this period, specifically in the century that followed the first advances of the scientific revolution, that nonhuman animals themselves became *humanized*, and here not only in the bad sense. Secularism and the Enlightenment led not only to new modalities of domination (above all colonialism), but also to procedural democracy, liberalism, socialism, the "rights of man"—and animal rights. With the spread of universalist and egalitarian ideals, it did not take a great leap of logic for some far-sighted individuals to see how other animals too might have an interest in freedom, liberty, and fraternity, or in not feeling pain.[43] Less than a decade after the storming of the

Bastille, an English reformer named Thomas Young wrote *An Essay on Humanity to Animals* (1798), in which he placed concern for other animals alongside "exertions . . . to diminish the sufferings of the prisoners, and to better the condition of the poor." Young vividly compared animal rights to "the interest excited in the nation by the struggles for the abolition of the slave trade" and suggested that both were signs of humanity taking small but meaningful steps toward social progress.[44] Many early proponents of vegetarianism and animal welfare in fact drew parallels with or personally participated in other liberal and radical causes for social emancipation, including abolitionism, prison reform, pacifism, women's rights, and workers' rights. The Scottish John Oswald converted to radical vegetarianism in the same moment that he became an anti-imperialist militant opposed to British colonialism in India.[45] Henry Salt, the most prominent and philosophically astute nineteenth-century advocate for animal rights, highlighted the connection between animal rights and the struggle to reform a capitalist system that was degrading to all beings, human workers and nonhuman animals alike. Salt was merely articulating the view of many other animal advocates at the time when he wrote in *Animals' Rights: Considered in Relation to Social Progress* (1894) that social reformers and animal rights activists alike were "working towards the same ultimate goal."[46]

Sadly, though, despite the broadly socialist and social democratic sympathies of animal rights proponents during the nineteenth century, few socialists in that period or in the century that followed were to acknowledge a tug of political conscience from the other side. The exceptions for the most part appear to have been feminists with socialist sympathies—Charlotte Perkins Gilman, for example, who portrayed the Amazonian inhabitants of her utopian novel *Herland* as vegetarian, or the anarchist Voltairine DeCleyre, who felt as passionately about the suffering of cats and dogs as she did about the oppression of the working class. Another exception was Peter Kropotkin, the Russian anarchist, who between 1890 and 1896 published a series of articles in the British journal *The Nineteenth Century* on the Darwinian case for the primacy of social cooperation (rather than the Spencerian emphasis on ruthless competition) in the animal and human worlds. Kropotkin not only acknowledged the advanced intelligence and emotional complexity of numerous other species besides our own, he also emphasized other animals' "joy of life" and "love of society for society's sake."[47] Other prominent nineteenth-century anarchist and socialist thinkers, including Mikhail Bakunin and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, held similarly generous opinions of the cognitive and social capacities of the other species, though none explicitly advocated animal rights as such (Charles Fourier, however, did advocate "gentleness" in animal husbandry, and he boasted that donkeys in his utopian

village of Harmony would "be much better housed and better kept than the peasants of the beautiful land of France"[48]). If such sentiments were a far cry from an explicit socialist critique of human domination, they were at least not dismissive of the notion that other animals might have lives and experiences that mattered, and they were not overtly hostile to movements promoting animal welfare. It therefore seems plausible that, had the early pluralism of anarchist and socialist thought been allowed to ferment and mature, radical thought might have developed in a more ecological, feminist, and animal liberationist direction. In the event, however, the brilliance of one socialist theorist was to outshine all the others, and in the consolidation of his staunchly anthropocentric vision of a "scientific" socialism, all thought to the suffering and oppression of other species was to be swept to one side for the next hundred years.

I am speaking, of course, of Karl Marx. It is well known that Marx and Engels held the animal welfare movements of their own time in contempt, placing "members of societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals" alongside "organisers of charity, temperance fanatics, [and] hole-and-corner reformers of every imaginable kind."[49] Engels himself was an avid fox-hunter, and neither he nor Marx thought to question the anthropocentric prejudices of their time, which they broadly accepted.[50] Despite his avowed intention of turning Hegel on his head (that is, right-side up), Marx never quite shook off the anthropocentric assumptions of the German idealists. Both Hegel and Kant had viewed freedom as the exercise and realization of an absolute, *human* freedom, and both denied that other animals, lacking such freedom, could have any intrinsic value of their own. Hegel's crypto-theological view of *Homo sapiens* as the pinnacle of creation, the ultimate expression of the self-consciousness of the universe, later found its way into Marx's historical materialism, in the latter's theory of the coming to self-consciousness of humanity through the praxis of the working class. Marx laid out his humanist conception of nature and of the purposes of human life at length in his extraordinary *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* of 1844. We might say that with Marx's *Manuscripts*, the modern humanist tradition that begins with Pico's *Oration on the Dignity of Man* in the sixteenth century and ends some four centuries later with Foucault's *The Order of Things* reaches its highest philosophical development and greatest spiritual expression.[51] Taking up Feuerbach's Hegelian conception of humankind as a self-conscious "species being," that is, a being whose life essence lies in its ability to lay hold of *itself* universally, as the total object of its own labor, consciousness, and will, Marx showed how the emergence of capitalism, and with it abstract labor, estranges human beings from one another as well as from internal and external nature. Rather than labor and produce "universally," or in accordance with the welfare of humankind as such, the

individual treats both the species and herself as a mere means to an end—as a source of crude pleasures and self-interested desires. Compulsory wage labor effectively reduces human beings therefore to the status of *animals*—that is, to beings incapable of exercising genuine autonomy. Animals too are capable of suffering and of producing their own means of existence. They too are *sensuous* beings. However, human sensuous life is qualitatively different from non-human sensuous life. Our senses only become truly human when they cease to be "merely" animal. Only under conditions of universal freedom do we achieve proper historical self-consciousness as a species being (and so come to define our collective life purpose). Like other scientific thinkers of his time, therefore, Marx did not try to come to terms with the consciousness of other beings. For him, nature—including other animals—was indistinguishable from "man's body"—hence a resource for humans to develop and control as the means to their own self-flourishing.

As all this suggests, and as Ted Benton shows in careful detail in his important chapter, "Speciesism = Humanism?: Marx on Humans and Animals" (originally published in 1988 and reprinted here for the first time), Marx's account of the nature and purposes of human existence revolves around an insupportable dualism that places human being on one side and animal being on the other. But while such a dualism was relatively uncontroversial a century and a half ago, it is no longer scientifically credible today. After nearly five centuries of portraying other animals as little more than automata (one or another variant of the mechanistic "stimulus and response" model), modern science is at last confirming what most ordinary human beings have known for millennia—namely, that other animals feel and think and experience the world.[52] Both evolutionary biology and the new science of cognitive ethology in particular have proved Charles Darwin right: that the difference between *Homo sapiens* and the other animals is a difference in degree rather than kind. Other animals have memories and feelings, fall in love, experience loss, mourn their dead, suffer, reason, have distinct cultures, use tools, communicate with one another, and on and on. Dolphins address each other using specific whistles, which function as individual names.[53] Whales transmit cultural innovations across and within the generations.[54] New Caledonian crows have been observed to fashion tools out of leaves—and to take them with them when they change nests. At least one parrot was taught over a hundred words and could answer questions in English concerning the qualities of presented objects (round, four-cornered, soft, and so forth).[55] Elephants have been observed in the wild coming to the assistance of injured or wounded strangers, working together to save infants from drowning, using medicinal plants, and engaging in rituals for (or related to) the dead. Species as varied as orcas, bonobo chimps, and European magpies, among others,

have passed the so-called "mirror test," acting in ways that show that they understand their image in the mirror to be of *themselves*.[56] But these are only a few examples of literally thousands available that show beyond any reasonable doubt that other species exist in temporal, meaningful, feeling, thinking worlds of their own. There is indeed every reason to believe that their worlds are at least as vivid and emotionally intense as our own, since the very capacities we fetishize as most valuable and meaningful in our own species—reason and speech—have probably dimmed or blunted our other sensuous capacities.[57] It is bracing to learn how *cognitively* and sensorily impaired we humans in fact are compared to many of the other species—for instance, to learn that the eyesight of wild turkeys is three times as acute as our own, that sharks perceive electrical fields, that the average bonobo can jump 30 percent higher than the top human athlete, or that the humble bar-tailed godwit, a seagoing bird, can fly 7,000 miles across the Pacific Ocean—nonstop. While no other terrestrial species has yet revealed itself to have our capacity for abstract, language-based reasoning, other animals do think, and some plan for the future, anticipate events, reflect on past experiences, and so on. Some primate species, including macaques, have been shown capable of discerning the internal mental states of other beings, including human beings (that is, to know whether subject A knows some fact X or not). In reality, though, it is hard to see how any socially complex organism, whether a bird, cetacean, or mammal could survive long in the world without a keen comprehension of the mental states and intentions of those around it. Moreover, while we are prone to think of the other animals as our perpetual cognitive inferiors, it turns out that at least some other species have more acute memory and high-level reasoning abilities than we do. The Clark nutcracker, for example, can remember the location of its nearly 3,000 individual food caches, hidden across 100 square miles of terrain; chimpanzees have easily defeated elite Japanese college students at short-term memory tests[58]; pigeons have bested U.S. college students in spatial reasoning exercises; and both pigeons and baboons have demonstrated a more robust capacity for "higher-order relational learning" than humans in controlled laboratory experiments.[59]

Other animals are *conscious* beings, they *exist* in the world. Phenomenologists exploring the nature of nonhuman consciousness have shown beyond any doubt that the other beings' phenomenological worlds, like ours, are richly rooted in personal meaning and signification.[60] While their experiences are therefore quite different from our own, the mere fact of their radical "otherness" does not therefore deprive their experiences or their existence of intrinsic existential and moral import. We need not deny or denigrate those qualities that may make human existence unique in order to at the same time affirm the cognitive, historical, and cultural capacities of other

species.[61] In this connection, Benton's point is not simply that Marx's humanist view of other animals is obsolete, but rather and more crucially "that he was wrong [about other animals] in ways which undermine his own view of the desirability of a changed relationship between humanity and nature in the future communist society." Marx was "wrong about animals in ways which cut him off from a powerful extension and deepening of his own ethical critique of prevailing (capitalist) modes of appropriation of nature." At stake, then, in Marx's mistaken understanding of other species is the question of the *adequacy* of our own theoretical frameworks for envisioning forms of historical praxis in the present. For if we persist in constructing a liberatory politics on the ground of a fraudulent ontology—an insupportable division between human and nonhuman consciousness and experience—we cannot identify our own true emancipatory interests, let alone those of the other conscious beings.

Regrettably, however, for reasons that are probably rooted in the psychology of speciesism itself, the Left's view of the other animals has remained stubbornly unchanged since the last century. The chasm opened up by Marx between socialism and animal liberationism grew wider after the "hard" masculine turn of the Bolshevik Revolution: the Leninist emphasis on the necessity of using ruthless violence to wage and preserve the gains of revolution further postponed any possibility of a rapprochement between the two movements. The consolidation of Stalinism proved especially catastrophic, preparing the way for state ecological catastrophes—and massive animal exploitation and killing—in the U.S.S.R. and China.[62] Hence today's "leftist cluelessness"—as Carl Boggs acidly describes the attitude of many contemporary radicals toward human domination and killing of other beings. Whether such blind indifference "derives from sheer ignorance," he asks, "or the simple prejudice of an addicted population, or simply reflects an intellectual myopia—or some combination of these," ultimately matters less than the fact that by ignoring the question of speciesism "the Left has abandoned any claim to critical thinking, much less oppositional politics."

Yet the fact that the Left has hitherto ignored the animal question in no wise reflects on the actual relevance or moral and *political* import of that question. As Renzo Llorente remarks in "Reflections on the Prospects for a Non-Speciesist Marxism," his chapter here, "nothing [in fact] commits Marxism to speciesism". The argument made by Garner and other liberal animal rights theorists, that because socialists have largely ignored animal rights neither they nor feminists therefore have anything substantive or useful to offer from "an animal protectionist perspective," only begs the question of whether and how speciesism as a social structure and ideology intersects with other modalities of oppression and domination. For while it is true that most

feminists and socialists have not taken animal liberationism seriously, it is also the case that many early socialists did not take feminism seriously, that leading suffragists were dismissive of the anti-slavery movement, and that many animal rights activists today remain blind to the many discursive connections between the treatment of animals and a mysogynist culture of male sexual violence against women. Existing prejudice is therefore a reliable guide neither to determination of the moral good nor to a practical sociology of power and oppression. In reality, both animal rights and socialism have a great deal to learn from one another. Indeed, several of our contributors suggest, they should be grasped as dependent parts of the same total critique of domination, exploitation, and systemic violence.

CAPITALISM AND THE STATE: SPECIESISM AS A MODE OF PRODUCTION

Notwithstanding the problems with Marx's anthropocentric and dualist ontology of freedom, the transcendence of speciesism can itself be viewed as part of our *Bildung* as a self-conscious species, as the formation of what Engels, in another context, termed "a really human morality." Both movements share an underlying normative commitment to "radical egalitarianism," as Llorente calls it, suggesting the theoretical basis for a "rapprochement" between the two traditions. In fact, neither animal liberation nor socialism can be conceived without the other.

First and foremost, as Mills and Williams suggest, "no social formation has been so deeply implicated in the maintenance and proliferation of the mistreatment of animals as capitalism."[63] Capitalism is not just one manifestation of human domination—it is the *highest, most maturely developed historical form* of that domination. Human beings have enslaved and killed other species for many thousands of years, but only in the modern period, under a new form of commodity relations, have living beings been reduced to pure objects. Marx's fourfold phenomenology of alienation under capitalism applies as readily to exploited animals as to factory workers.[64] As Henry Salt observed more than a century ago, "[i]n the rush and hurry of a competitive society, where commercial profit is avowed to be the main object of work, and where the well-being of men and women is ruthlessly sacrificed to that object, what likelihood is there that the lower animals will not be used with a sole regard to the same predominant purpose?"[65] Commodity fetishism and privatization destroy human and human–nonhuman solidarity, estrange us from nature, and compromise and weaken democratic institutions, stripping all living beings of any intrinsic value other than one—surplus value (commercial profit). As Dennis Soron

shows in his chapter here, "Road Kill: Commodity Fetishism and Structural Violence," speciesism is articulated in and through a system of institutional violence—capitalism—which in turn assumes shape and meaning only through speciesism and its rituals of domination. Drawing attention to one of the most egregious yet neglected features of our de facto state of war against other animals—the hundreds of millions of animals maimed and killed annually on our highways and roads—Soron shows how the manufacture and marketing of sadistic "road kill" products mocking the suffering of nonhuman beings—including plush toys for children with tire tracks imprinted on the animal's back and fake intestines hanging out—reflects the hidden violence and alienating logic of commodity fetishism as such.) Capitalism, in short, is inimical to freedom *qua* freedom, human and nonhuman alike.

Contra the liberal view of speciesism as a set of mistaken (and hence more or less easily corrected) *beliefs* about the world, speciesism is a *mode of production* in its own right, in Marx and Engels' specific usage of that term as "a definite form of expressing . . . life, a definite *mode of life*." That is, speciesism is not a fixed ideology or an unchanging essence, but rather a complex, dynamic, expansive system that is materially and ideologically imbricated with capitalism as such. Speciesism is a thoroughly historical way of relating to other beings, just as capitalism itself is a thoroughly historical way of relating to nature as such. Among other things, this suggests that the misplaced emphasis in the liberal animal rights literature on the history of ideas, often at the expense of social history and of a more probing inquiry into the nature and origin of human violence, is missing the big picture. Much has been made by contemporary philosophers of Descartes's views of the mind and body, for example, but little of the emergence of capitalism or the consolidation of a new form of patriarchy in early modern Europe, even though it was the capitalist instrumentalization of nature, in combination with a newly emphatic system of male control over women, that formed the profane ground upon which the speciesist thought of Descartes, Bacon, Malebranche, and so on stood forth.[66] As Marx observed, "Descartes with his definition of animals as mere machines saw with the eyes of the manufacturing period, while in the eyes of the Middle Ages, animals were man's assistants."[67] Today, we see animals through the eyes of biotechnology and global finance capital. In other words, the way we produce our lives is organized around the way we view and treat the other animals, and this is a historical process.

The importance of the *animal* as one of the most important loci for the ongoing, fundamental composition of capitalism can be seen in the shift from a Fordist to a post-Fordist regime of capital accumulation. According to the Regulation school of Marxist theory, capitalism stabilizes itself by forming new "regimes" of capital accumulation, overcoming contradictions

in the existing arrangement of forces by consolidating new forms of economy, society, state, and cultural life. The only transition that theorists have examined in any detail is that between Fordist and post-Fordist forms of production. The former, so named because of the mass assembly line developed by Henry Ford, was based (inter alia) on mass production of standardized goods, mass consumer markets, vertical lines of control, capital-intensive technological innovation, and the formation of a welfare state to stabilize labor–capital relations. Post-Fordism, by contrast, mixes mass production and standardization with "batch" or niche production and consumption, globally dispersed or horizontal lines of control, technologies based on computerization, a post-welfare or neoliberal state, and new forms of culture, family life, and sexuality. In this context, Regulation theory takes on a whole new look when viewed through the lens of speciesism as a mode of production. While Fordism is typically associated with the rise of the mass-produced automobile, Nicole Shukin points out that Henry Ford in fact modeled his storied auto assembly line at Highland Park "on moving lines that had been operating at least since the 1850s in the vertical abattoirs of Cincinnati and Chicago, with deadly efficiency and to deadly effect"—the same rationalized killing process immortalized in Upton Sinclair's *The Jungle* (published seven years before Highland Park opened).[68] American monopoly capital eventually took these earlier, relatively crude efforts at mass slaughter to a new levels of efficiency, streamlining technologies to raise, transport, and slaughter hundreds of thousands of pigs in gigantic factories.[69] The mass killing of nonhuman beings was thus central to Fordism, not to mention to the model of routinized, administratively efficient, spatially extended mass killing adopted by the Nazis to liquidate European Jewry, Roma, and other "enemies" of the capitalist German state under the Third Reich. The effectiveness of Fordism as a coherent regime of capital accumulation in fact owed a great deal to a new language and culture around the industrialized production and consumption of animal bodies, one that reinforced narratives of national strength, gender roles, home life, and so on. The ready availability of meat in particular was a key ideological and cultural feature of the 1920s–1950s period, particularly in forming a new consuming subject.[70] The stockyards and slaughterhouses of Chicago not only enabled the expansion of the middle class, they even helped, at a semiotic level, to stabilize and legitimate the capitalist state. Hence the slogan of the Republican Party during the presidential campaign of 1928, promising "a chicken in every pot . . . [a]nd a car in every backyard," which linked American prosperity to automobility and mass slaughter of animals.[71]

Today, the animal is one of the most important sites for the reproduction and expansion of post-Fordist capital. As Shukin writes, "animal and capital are

increasingly produced as a semiotic and material closed loop," a "nauseating recursivity" in which "capital becomes animal, animal becomes capital."[72] As before, the Taylorized mass killing of nonhuman beings remains central to the economies of the industrialized nations.[73] The globalization of production and financialization of capital since the 1980s has made possible the spatial expansion of mass animal confinement and slaughter technologies and procedures to all four corners of the earth. Faced with the possibility of declining demand at home (in part as a result of increased public awareness of factory farms), U.S. companies have exported American-style meat consumption patterns to Asia, the Pacific Rim, North Africa, and Latin America. To meet the demands of a rising middle class that has come to expect cheap, readily available pig flesh, Chinese companies are hastily constructing mass killing facilities. A similar dynamic holds sway in Eastern Europe, where hundreds of small-scale family pig farms are being eliminated overnight and replaced by huge, concentration camp–style facilities owned and operated by giant U.S. agricultural interests.

What is key is that the appropriation and control of other beings is being organized along post-Fordist, rather than Fordist, lines. In place of Fordism's vertical lines of production we find animal slavery and killing being integrated horizontally, across globally dispersed commodity chains, and driven by finance capital. Mass standardization of animal products persist; yet more and more we see product differentiation and niche marketing, like the "batch production" of animal commodities like Kobe and Angus beef, new markets in so-called "free range" eggs and "humanely killed" veal calves, and what we might call ontological hybridization (as fish oil in orange juice, now standard fare in Tropicana juices). If the Fordist regime of accumulation required the construction of a new mass consumer whose desires could be standardized to fit the needs of manufacturers, the post-Fordist regime is interested in creating a fragmented market of savvy, educated consumers. The world ecological crisis and the rise of a determined animal rights movement has made it necessary for the animal industry to develop new psychological and discursive frames in civil society to justify the continued exploitation of nonhuman beings for sport and killing. Animal capital has to this end conjured into being a large, well-funded hidden army of consultants, lobbyists, and marketing and behavioral experts charged with the twin objectives of shoring up the ideological base of speciesism as a mode of production and undermining the credibility of animal rights groups (such as by branding the latter as irrational terrorists.)[74] Just as Fordism interpellated a new form of mass consuming subject, post-Fordism is "hailing" a new, post–animal rights consumer to preserve the overall regime of animal capital.

Responding to social movements promoting socially responsible consumption, for example, the Whole Foods directorate has found a way to encourage

renewed consumption of other animals through the rhetoric of "green" capitalism and "humane" farming—that is, through commercially driven campaigns whose function if not purpose is to do an end run around animal rights. Instead of challenging a global political economy based on killing, popular writers like Michael Pollan and Barbara Kingsolver (sadly, a leftist) have advocated "locavore" consumption as the solution to the world environmental crisis. Such critics advocate the exploitation and home-grown killing of captive chickens, goats, and other animals, portraying such practices as ethically and ecologically ideal. But as Vasile Stănescu shows in his contribution to our volume, "'Green' Eggs and Ham? The Myth of Sustainable Meat and the Danger of the Local," the new liberal defense of "personal" and local killing is rooted in unsupportable ecological arguments and resonates in disturbing ways with the "romanticized *autochthonous* relationship with both the soil and the local" once seen in National Socialism. Locavorism not only papers over the violence and exploitation that attends backyard animal butchery; it also seems to have an affinity for misogynistic and potentially racist discourses. Far from being a liberatory movement, then, locavorism is entirely consistent with a post-Fordist, neoliberal order that favors localism over internationalism, batch production, "resistance" through consumption, and nativist sentiments that can be mobilized by the political right.

Under Fordism, technological innovation played a pivotal role, enabling new scales of efficiency and engendering new cultural media as means for shaping mass consumer behavior and desire. Technology plays a similarly pivotal role in post-Fordist capitalist relations and structures, with animals again a core component of the new order. Thus, the information revolution has made possible whole new scales of efficiency in animal exploitation, enabling a single farmer, say, to control the biological rhythms and behavior of tens of thousands of egg-laying hens at once using wholly automated means. Computers are used not only to control the environments of factory-farmed animals, but also to track markets and investment strategies and to design ever more efficient means for rendering animals into capital. If the exploitation of other animals is the original or most primitive form of value accumulation in human culture, we must never forget that it is also the most protean and hypermodern, a source of endless technical adaptation and variation. In 2010, for example, Hewlett Packard, the world's largest computer manufacturer, released a report making the case for turning fecal waste from concentration camps for hogs into fuel to power high-technology companies like Google and Microsoft—an effort to make even the biological waste of this ghastly *perpetuum mobile* of mass suffering productive for capital.

But such Rube Goldberg schemes aside, animals are proving central to the new regime of accumulation in more profound ways. Specifically, if in the

Fordist era animals played an exemplary role as depersonalized, factory-produced mass commodities, in the post-Fordist era they *become* the factories, generative sites for the batch production of living human organs or designer drugs (secreted by the glands of genetically modified animals). Just as capital has penetrated to the deepest recesses of the human psyche, molding sexuality, identity, and consciousness itself, so too has capitalist technoscience penetrated to the very core of animal being, manipulating goats, sheep, chickens, dogs, cats, and others at the level of ontology. Different modes of existence, of being-in-the-world, can now be "Taylored" to the needs of Big Pharma and the biomedical industry. Today's factory-pharmed chicken, its genetic sequence plotted out virtually on a computer, is merely the ontologized form of finance capital. As Karen Davis observes in her chapter on the Procrustes myth, broiler hens bred for maximum efficiency experience their own "industrialized" bodies as "a wracking construction of pains and pathologies, including cardiovascular disease, crippled skeletons, and necroses of the skin, leg joints, and intestines." The doom of factory-farmed animals, she writes, is not to be faced with extinction but on the contrary "to be proliferated in virtually endless . . . re-formations of their bodies to fit the procrustean beds of global industrial agriculture and research."

What drives these and other colonizations and distortions of the nonhuman person is not an ancient *idea*—speciesism "as such"—but rather the most advanced forms of finance capital. Hedge funds now trade in global pork belly futures and the cattle business. A watershed was reached with the creation of the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index in 1991, which reduced the leading agricultural commodities, including cocoa, wheat, and live cattle to a single abstract mathematical formula (other banks quickly followed suit, creating new commodity indices of their own).[75] The consequence was in essence to liberate agricultural products—including living animals—from consumer supply and demand, transforming them into an aggregate financial instrument. What drives increased cattle production today in Latin America (as elsewhere) are international monetary and banking institutions, backed by the ruthless power of the neoliberal state.[76] As Carl Boggs writes in his analysis here of "Corporate Power, Ecological Crisis, and Animal Rights," the destruction and destabilization of the global ecosystem is the logical outcome of a total civilizational modality rooted in contempt for other beings and powerful commercial interests. Capitalism's "relentless assault on nonhuman nature" and in particular on other sentient beings in particular is spelling the destruction of our living world, or at least great portions of it. Already, the world capitalist system has so poisoned and destabilized the global ecosystem, through toxic waste, habitat destruction, killing sports, the slaughter industries, and climate change, that thousands of sentient species have been forced

to the brink of extinction. One in every four mammalian species is at risk of disappearing forever in the next few decades; the outlook for reptiles, amphibians, and many species of fish is no better. Animal liberation and capitalism are in sum not merely in tension with one another, they are mutually incompatible modes of civilizational development.

Finally, we might take especial note of the changing nature of the nation-state under post-Fordism and the importance of animals to the transition. As Boggs shows, it is the coercive power of the U.S. state—an imperial power harnessed by elites in the interests of expanding corporate power on a global, not merely national or regional scale—that virtually ensures that perpetual war is waged against the other beings of the planet. The capitalist state as such directly supports recreational killing of animals through its fish and wildlife "management" agencies, sets fraudulent "ethical" standards for the treatment of lab animals, pours billions of dollars into animal-based research, and of course provides huge public subsidies for the dairy and meat industries. Meanwhile, because animal exploitation is both a leading source of value under capitalist relations and a source of national power (both symbolically and economically), the state has set out to defend animal capital by repressing the social movements that threaten it.[77] In 2006, thus, the U.S. government approved the draconian Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, a bill intended not merely to discourage the more militant, direct action wing of the movement—some of whose members have in fact engaged in property destruction, firebombings, or the intimidation of medical researchers—but to put the animal rights movement as a whole on notice that the state is willing to use its vast coercive powers to protect animal industries, which elites view as a linchpin of the economic order. The "return" of an authoritarian, post-liberal state—one of the characteristic features of the post-Fordist order—is therefore directly bound up with the animal question.

BEYOND LIBERALISM—TOWARD A RADICAL CRITIQUE

Having unpacked the relationship between capital and speciesism in some detail, we can now double back to consider the liberal position of animal rights theorists, articulated by Garner and implicit to most other analytic philosophical treatments of the subject, that neither socialism nor feminism have much to offer from an animal liberationist perspective. And here, we might turn the liberal objection on its head by asking whether liberalism itself—that is, liberal theory and liberal institutions (including, by definition, capitalism and the capitalist state)—offers a sturdy enough theoretical platform from which to mount a sustained challenge to speciesism.

Since first publication of Peter Singer's *Animal Liberation* in 1975, animal rights discourse has in fact been dominated by liberal, analytic moral philosophers—particularly Singer, Tom Regan, and (with rather less fanfare and self-promotion) the British ethicist Mary Midgley. These and a handful of other first-rate philosophers, including legal scholars like Gary Francione, David DeGrazia, and Steve Wise, deserve the lion's share of credit for the relative intellectual respectability of animal rights today. Though it is true that the animal rights movement as such preceded such writers by more than a century—Singer's *Animal Liberation* owed many of its horrific empirical descriptions of animal labs and factory farms to the archives and research of well-established activist groups like Friends of Animals—there is no question that the analytic philosophers armed a generation of activists throughout the world with powerful, well-reasoned arguments against factory farming, vivisection, the fur industry, and other institutions of violence and exploitation. It is therefore unsurprising that the liberal critique of animal exploitation has become over the years *the* critique of animal rights. Still, there are important epistemological and political limits to the liberal, analytical, moral critique of speciesism that need to be foregrounded.[78]

First, we must ask whether liberal moral philosophy can fully illuminate a social and existential problem of the scale and complexity of human species domination. What do we lose when we try to contain the cataclysmic violence we human beings enact on the minds and bodies of the other species within the arid terms of Anglo-American analytic philosophy? It is striking that the keenest and most enduring insights into what the human condition looks like when glimpsed through the lens of absolute evil have historically come to us from novelists, theologians, and Continental philosophers—that is, from the minds and hearts of such broadly-trained intellectuals steeped in the history of ideas and culture as Theodor Adorno, Emmanuel Levinas, Hannah Arendt, Karl Jaspers, Primo Levi, and Zygmunt Bauman, to name a few. Writing in the shadow of the concentration camps and the mushroom clouds over Japan, such critics achieved a depth of historical and spiritual insight into evil that one searches for in vain among the writings of even the most acclaimed analytic philosophers and ethicists of the same period, including W. V. Quine, A. J. Ayers, Stephen Toulmin, Kurt Baier, or R. M. Hare. The former set of critics framed the problem of evil in the broadest possible socio-political, historical, and existential terms. They depicted European genocide and nuclear holocaust not simply as an analytical problem or a failure of *ideas*, but as a profound challenge to the human condition. By extension and analogy, it is fair to ask whether it is possible to make sense of today's animal holocaust without invoking a similarly wide range of historical, sociological, philosophical, and even theological approaches.

A second drawback to framing the problem of human domination, a special problem of moral philosophy, is the vulnerablity of liberal thought in general to the overdeterminations of power. Feminist animal liberation theorists were the first to point out the problem with the moral analytic school's continued reliance on conceptual categories and methods drawn from the same masculinist well of rationality, disinterestedness, and objectivity that constitute speciesism as an ideology and historical practice.[79] Pioneered by Carol Adams and Josephine Donovan in the 1990s, the radical feminist critique introduced a much-needed historical and socio-political dimension to our understanding of speciesism, revealing the crucial roles that power and ideology play in the "othering" of animals and women alike. Patriarchy and speciesism are perhaps the two oldest and most fundamental ideologies of *Herrschaft* (or domination by a master race): the oppression of women by men and the oppression of nonhumans by humans have reinforced one another for centuries,[80] and the oppression of animals and women is justified on the basis of the two groups' presumed similarities to one another. As Catharine MacKinnon observes in a recent essay, both speciesism and patriarchy are based on a "natural" hierarchy, and though "a hierarchy of people over animals is conceded and a social hierarchy of men over women is often denied, the fact that the inequality is imposed by the dominant group tends to be denied in both cases."[81]

It is therefore perplexing and troubling that the leading male animal rights philosophers have by and large ignored, trivialized, or misrepresented the feminist critique of human domination.[82] It is especially striking how few male animal rights philosophers will admit that they actually *care* what happens to other animals, preferring either to write dispassionately about objective animal "interests" or deontological principles (an aversion to sentiment that can be traced to the traditional Western terror of the female body and "feminine" emotions like compassion) or, alternately, to strike an aggressive tone of angry militancy, replete with macho references to activists as "warriors." As Carol Adams notes in her chapter here, "After MacKinnon: Sexual Inequality in the Animal Movement," the absence of a feminist critique within the animal movement has diminished its moral authority and sapped its organizational efficacy.[83] The fact that PETA, for example, the largest animal rights group in the world, features pornography on its website—its "State of the Union Undress" intercuts images of maimed and suffering animals with a very young, thin white woman awkwardly stripping to reveal her shaved vulva—is a testament not merely to the appalling lack of feminist scruples within the movement, but to the power of a misogynist culture to define the discursive terms of even erstwhile "oppositional" social movement culture.[84] But as Adams writes, "[so] long as the movement refuses to acknowledge that it is a part of a dominant culture in which women's inequality still prevails, so long as it resists addressing . . . this

inequality, it will unconsciously undermine its own vision for a new kind of society, one based on genuinely universal equality, justice, and caring."

The continuing failure by liberal philosophers and political theorists to see the relevance of feminist concerns, whether in animal liberation studies or in other arenas of critical theory, is in fact symptomatic of a wider tendency in liberal thought as such to abstract social problems from their historical context and thereby to neglect the complex sociology of power and systemic violence. As indicated above, over and over in the philosophical literature one encounters an erudite but overdrawn emphasis on the history of ideas, often at the expense of social history and a more probing inquiry into the nature and origin of human violence. Political economy, social and class position, gender and sexuality, and so forth matter less in the critique than the metaphysical spread of "ideas"[85] and a naïve faith in the redemptive power of philosophical argument alone.[86] Such accounts tend both to minimize the irrationality of speciesism—its rootedness in our minds, bodies, practices, discourses, institutions, identities, and so forth—and to occlude the structural preconditions and institutional underpinnings of speciesism as a set of diverse, overlapping modalities of domination. Certainly one shouldn't understate the power of ideas; but one shouldn't understate the overdetermination of ideas by social power, either. The trouble with the idealist bias in analytic philosophy is that it tends to lead either to voluntarism—for example, putting one's faith in changes in individual "lifestyle"—or to forms of analysis that seem oblivious to the many connections that link speciesism with other systems of power and dominance.

This returns us again to the province of Marx and to the lack of a clear anticapitalist commitment within the mainstream animal movement. On the one hand, it is true that important animal welfare advances have been made within the framework of liberal capitalism: more legislative progress has been made on the animal question in the last ten years than in the previous two hundred. In 2002, for example, Germany added an animal protection clause to its constitution, and in 2008 the Spanish Parliament passed an unprecedented law granting human rights to other primates. Yet such reforms have so far been largely symbolic, and they have had no discernible impact on the pace or scale of animalcide at a global level. On the contrary, after a period of gradual decline in the number of animals killed in scientific laboratories worldwide during the 1970s to 1990s the total number appears to be increasing. The prospect for abolishing the unspeakable conditions of animals in factory farms, meanwhile, remains abysmal, despite growing public awareness that animal "agriculture" is one of the biggest causes of global climate change. In 2006, the U.S. government projected an 11 percent growth rate for jobs in the animal slaughter and processing industry over the next decade, and between 2003 and 2009 (before the recession of 2008), American dairy exports quadrupled, from $1 billion to $4 billion.[87]

Legislative reforms and lifestyle changes alone are therefore not enough to slow, let alone end, the juggernaut—we must also deal somehow with the underlying social relations that give rise to a total system of domination. So long as those relations remain intact, the future misery of billions of animals is ensured. It is thus no minor theoretical limitation in the published works of the leading liberal moral philosophers that nowhere in their pages does the reader brush up against a full-blown critique of capitalism. As Dennis Soron observes in his chapter, while the animal movement criticizes the treatment of animals *as* commodities, "it has tended to regard commodification less as [an essential] . . . feature of capitalist production than as a matter of morally inappropriate attitudes and behaviors.") But such blindness to the role that class stratification and social power more generally play in the animal–human equation cannot but blunt our analysis and seriously hobble the movement as a whole—to say nothing of the fact that it condemns billions of *human* animals too, to the misery, deprivation, starvation, violence, and war that capitalism produces each and every day.

Left unanswered in the liberal account, in short, is how we are to envision effective challenges to the animal holocaust in the absence of a penetrating critique of, among other things, patriarchy and male violence, the links between racialization and animalization, or the capitalist state as such—that structural bulwark for, and juridical guarantor of, the animal exploitation industry. To develop animal rights campaigns without an eye out for the deeper contradictions and tendencies of capitalist world system puts the movement at risk of merely displacing, rather than eliminating, particular forms of animal slavery. Pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, for example, are already outsourcing animal experimentation to countries where "scientists are cheap and plentiful and animal rights activists are muffled by an authoritarian state"—in much the same way that the U.S. state under President Bush outsourced torture, and U.S. and European companies now routinely outsource jobs to Third World countries with weak labor and environmental standards.[88] As the CEO of an American pharmaceutical company in San Francisco explained in 2006, China offers "big benefits and a 5-year tax holiday." But the main incentives for relocating the dirty work to China are political. "Animal testing," the CEO told a reporter, "does not have the political issues [in China that] it has in the US or Europe or event India, where there are religious issues as well." The combination of economic and political incentives explains why "big Pharma is looking to move to China in a big way." Already, "in terms of animal supply . . . China is a good place to be, as it is the world's largest supplier of lab monkeys and canines—mostly beagles."[89] (Four years later, in 2010, Charles River Labs of Massachusetts, the world's largest supplier of research animals to the scientific community, in fact acquired WuXi AppTec, a Chinese research lab, in a deal totaling over $1.5 billion.[90])

CONCLUSION

Animal liberationism therefore cannot do without socialism, nor without Marx's critical phenomenology of capital. By the same token, however, if animal rights needs socialism, socialism without animal liberationism is itself false and one-sided.[91] If socialism is a mode of life in which humans live in harmony both with their own authentic natures and with the natural world, then it is unclear how a socialist movement premised on the domination of other animals cannot but contradict itself. Because we are animals ourselves, what "we" do to "them" we also do to ourselves—in two senses. First, in oppressing our kin, we become estranged from ourselves, placing ourselves in perpetual flight from our own embodied, desiring, suffering, and (potentially) rational selves. Second, to affirm a socialism without animal liberation is to affirm a civilization based on continual antagonism with the rest of nature. It is to suggest that an ideal society, a society of *universal* freedom and justice, could be founded upon enslavement, exploitation, and organized mass killing of *other persons*. Such a repugnant notion cannot be maintained, either in practice or in theory, without contradicting itself at its roots. A speciesist socialism thus contradicts itself causally and materially, because speciesism itself serves as one of the crucial ideological props of the capitalist system, a system which, in its anti-ecological iniquities, more and more poses a threat to human civilization itself.[92]

Hence the need to overcome the animal rights movement's liberal *weltanshauung* by bringing these two movements, socialism and animal liberation, into closer alliance, and indeed into coalescence. The chapters in *Critical Theory and Animal Liberation* argue that such a convergence between the two traditions is not only possible, but urgently needed.[93] And not just "two" traditions: many of our authors rightly insist on the need to set the structures of speciesism in the context of a much wider epistemological and social system of patriarchal violence. It is *men* as a class who are the primary efficient cause of the unhappiness of the world, the purveyors of what Erich Fromm (another early member of the Frankfurt School) termed a "necrophilic" civilization.[94] Our writers for this reason collectively speak to the need for a comprehensive, holist conception of praxis, a common language of politics, community, and liberation able to bridge the divide between socialism and feminism, race and class, North and South, human and nonhuman, masculine and feminine. Hence, the especial importance in these pages of Josephine Donovan's chapter—revised and with a new introduction by the author—"Sympathy and Interspecies Care: Toward a Unified Theory of Eco- and Animal Liberation." Donovan identifies four theoretical currents that seem to be converging: ecofeminism, Marxism, phenomenology, and sympathy theory. The latter two traditions in particular point the way toward a new societal order based on compassion for

the suffering other, including and especially the most vulnerable class of sufferers, the other animals. Together, all four intersecting traditions "point to a recognition of the subjective reality of animals," for the first time creating "the possibility of a new unified theory of animal (and indeed human, indeed earthly) liberation."

Like the other writers gathered here, Donovan attempts less to spell out a comprehensive new approach than to clear the ground for one, not merely by drawing attention to the ideological and material conditions of speciesism but by noting the aporias, absences, and contradictions in contemporary political and social thought. Like the works of the early Frankfurt School, whose members sought above all to offer an image of *negation* of an existing order whose "positive" features in fact represent the negation or forgetting of the true bases of creaturely happiness, the chapters in *Critical Theory and Animal Liberation* thus offer only a promissory note on the redemption of humankind—the solace of critique in the face of overwhelming violence.

In this connection, it seems appropriate to bring our introduction to a close by recalling an especially poignant passage in Adorno's *Minima Moralia*. Describing his experience during his years of exile from Germany, when "in a mood of helpless sadness" he discovers himself using the incorrect subjunctive of a verb native to the dialect of his German home town, Adorno writes: "Language sent back to me like an echo the humiliation which unhappiness had inflicted on me in forgetting what I am."[95] We might say that the purpose of this volume, in seeking to bring the critical tradition to bear on "the animal question," is to restore the memory of what we were—or, rather, what we might become—before power inflicted unhappiness upon us: free, creative, ethical beings able to live in solidarity and harmony with one another and with other animals within a wider ecological order. Only by affirming such a memory, of a past that never was, might we discover a way of living in the present that does not concede the future to an unending terror.